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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS: STAUNCH
DEFENDER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS
Christopher E. Smith*
INTRODUCTION
As Justice John Paul Stevens reached his milestone ninetieth birth-
day in 2010, observers anticipated'-and Justice Stevens himself con-
firmed2-that he planned to retire from the Supreme Court after
nearly thirty-five years of service as an Associate Justice.3 At the end
of his career on the Court, commentators acknowledged his impor-
tance and influence in the characterizations that they made about him:
"master strategist";4 "leader of the [C]ourt's liberal wing";5 "indepen-
dent-minded jurist";6 and "'strongest, most articulate voice on the
[C]ourt defending the rights of criminal defendants and racial, relig-
ious, and other minorities."' 7 The conclusion of Justice Stevens's ca-
reer is an appropriate moment to assess his impact on the
development of law. This Article evaluates the contributions of Ste-
vens by focusing on the important and controversial issue of Miranda
warnings8 and the Fifth Amendment entitlement of suspects to be in-
formed of their rights prior to custodial questioning. 9
* Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. A.B., Harvard University, 1980;
M.Sc., University of Bristol (U.K.), 1981; J.D., University of Tennessee, 1984; Ph.D., University
of Connecticut, 1988.
1. Adam Liptak, A Justice Slows His Hiring, and Some Wonder About His Future, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at A14.
2. See Robert Barnes, After Years as Justice, John Paul Stevens Wants What's 'Best for the
Court,' WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2010, at Al ("[Stevens's] departure will hand President Obama his
second chance to leave a lasting mark on the nine-member Supreme Court. 'I will surely do it
while he's still [P]resident,' Stevens said, who plans to leave either this year or next.").
3. Justice Stevens was nominated for the Supreme Court by President Gerald Ford on No-
vember 28, 1975 to replace retiring Justice William 0. Douglas. The U.S. Senate voted 98-0 to
confirm him on December 17, 1975. THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK 206 (Carolyn Goldinger
ed., 1990).
4. Liptak, supra note 1, at A14.
5. Id.
6. Jeff Bleich et al., Justice John Paul Stevens: A Maverick, Liberal, Libertarian, Conservative
Statesman on the Court, 67 OR. ST. B. BULL. 26, 27 (2006).
7. Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court's Stevens Keeps Cards Close to Robe, USA TODAY, Oct. 19,
2009, at 1A (quoting Harvard law professor Richard Fallon).
8. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. This Article will mention a few illustrative cases concerning, but
will not focus closely on, the related Sixth Amendment right to counsel that is intertwined with
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II. SUPPORT FOR MIRANDA ON THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona'o created tre-
mendous controversy as law enforcement officials and other critics of
the Warren Court claimed that the ruling would prevent police and
prosecutors from obtaining the incriminating statements that they re-
garded as essential for securing criminal convictions." Over time,
many police officers came to accept their obligation to inform arrested
suspects of the rights to remain silent and have access to an attorney
during questioning.12 This acceptance reflected, in part, police of-
ficers' recognition that they could adapt their behavior in ways that
still enabled them to constitutionally elicit incriminating statements.' 3
For example, officers sometimes ask questions prior to making a for-
mal arrest or pretend to befriend the suspect during interrogation.14
As the Supreme Court's composition changed through the arrival of
new Justices appointed by Republican presidents from 1969 through
the early 1990s, 5 majorities on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts is-
Miranda rights when police seek to question suspects already represented by counsel or already
formally charged with crimes. See, e.g., Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (examining
whether an indicted suspect interviewed by police outside the presence of defense counsel vio-
lates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
10. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
11. See generally ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 460 (1997).
12. See STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 357
(4th ed. 1993).
13. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: MYTHS AND REALITIES 119-20
(2004).
14. See, e.g., BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTA-
TION AND IMPACT 84 (2d ed. 1999) (prior to making an arrest, detectives may invite suspects to
the station house or go to suspects' homes to ask questions because Miranda only applies when
suspects are in custody and have lost their voluntary freedom of movement); Richard C. Leo,
Miranda's Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 259, 275
(1996) ("[Tlhe detective portrays himself as the suspect's friend and ally, if not the suspect's
advocate, implicitly seeking the suspect's trust and confidence.").
15. President Richard Nixon appointed Chief Justice Warren Burger in 1969, Justice Harry
Blackmun in 1970, Justice Lewis Powell in 1971, and Justice William Rehnquist in 1971. Presi-
dent Gerald Ford appointed Justice John Paul Stevens in 1975. President Ronald Reagan nomi-
nated Justice Antonin Scalia in 1987 and Justice Anthony Kennedy in 1988. THE SUPREME
COURT AT WORK, supra note 3, at 203-08. President George H.W. Bush appointed Justice
David Souter in 1990 and Justice Clarence Thomas in 1991. JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER
HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT 161, 212 (1995). With the ex-
ception of Justice Stevens, all of these Justices were appointed with the intention of making the
Supreme Court markedly more conservative. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 106-20 (3d ed. 1993). Justice Stevens has observed
that these appointees were each more conservative than the Justice whom they replaced. See
Biskupic, supra note 7, at 1A.
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sued decisions that gave police greater flexibility concerning when1 6
and how'7 they delivered Miranda warnings to suspects. As a result,
some scholars argue that Miranda warnings no longer have much im-
pact on the work of police in investigating criminal cases and ques-
tioning suspects.18 Despite the diminished impact of Miranda
warnings, debates continue about whether the Warren Court's deci-
sion represents a proper interpretation of the Constitution1 9 and
whether it endangers the public by impeding investigations, prosecu-
tions, and convictions of dangerous criminal offenders. 20
Amid more than four decades of such debates, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly reexamined, clarified, and modified the Miranda re-
quirements in response to adaptive police behavior,21 new situations, 22
16. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 650 (1984) (declaring that Miranda warnings
are not immediately required for suspects in custody when an urgent "public safety" situation
requires officers to ask questions without taking the time to recite warnings).
17. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202 (1989) (holding that police officers are
not required to recite warnings exactly as specified in the original decision in Miranda).
18. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Rehnquist Revolution in Criminal Procedure, in THE
REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 54, 63 (Herman Schwartz ed., 2002)
("[T]he Court did not need to overrule Miranda because it had already eviscerated most of its
protections."); WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA'S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION
PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 99 (2001) ("[T]here is little reason to believe that interrogators
will be any less effective in obtaining waivers than they are in eliciting statements. Thus, when
these strategies are employed, Miranda's costs to law enforcement are likely to be negligible.").
19. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 173-74 (1993) ("Going be-
yond a mere conclusion that specific police conduct had violated the Constitution, the Court
'legislated' a set of four specific warnings . . . . The Court even conceded that the Constitution
did not necessarily require adherence to this particular scheme for protecting Fifth Amendment
rights . . . ."). But see Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 64 (1990)
(testimony of David H. Souter, Nominee, United States Supreme Court) ("[T]he point of Mi-
randa was to produce a practical means to avoid what seemed to be unduly time consuming and
sometimes intractable problems encountered in the Federal courts in dealing with claims that
confessions were inadmissible on grounds of their involuntariness."); see also GOODWIN Liu,
PAMELA S. KARLAN & CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION
(2009).
The [Miranda] decision itself is faithful to the Constitution in the way it interprets the
document's text and principles to sustain their vitality as our society and institutions
change over time. In particular, Miranda adapts the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination to important transformations of the criminal justice system that have
occurred since the Founding era.
Id. at 92-93.
20. See generally Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Falling Clearance Rates After Miranda:
Coincidence or Consequence?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1998). But see Floyd Feeney, Police
Clearances: A Poor Way to Measure the Impact of Miranda on the Police, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1
(2000).
21. In one case, police interrogated a suspect without Miranda warnings, then delivered warn-
ings and convinced the suspect to repeat the information in an attempt to immunize the interro-
gation from the exclusionary rule. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604-07 (2004).
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and fundamental challenges to the Warren Court ruling.23 In these
cases, as acknowledged by Justice David Souter in his confirmation
hearings, the Supreme Court must "ask very practical questions about
how [the Miranda rule] actually works." 24 Thus, the examination of
cases raising Miranda issues calls upon the Supreme Court's Justices
to apply their personal understandings of human behavior and police
practices,25 as well as their particular orientations toward constitu-
tional interpretation. 26
As indicated in Table 1 below, Justice John Paul Stevens stands out
among the Justices with whom he has served as a staunch defender of
Miranda-related Fifth Amendment rights. The Table shows each Jus-
tice's percentage of support for individuals as opposed to the govern-
ment in Miranda cases. Typically, support for individuals is classified
as the "liberal" position in criminal justice cases according to analyses
by scholars who study Supreme Court decision making.27 Overall,
Justice Stevens was second only to Justice Thurgood Marshall in his
percentage of support for individuals in Miranda-issue cases (as
demonstrated in the second numeric column).
22. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (examining the applicability of Mi-
randa requirements to a police station informational interview of a drunk-driving arrestee).
23. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (striking down an Act of Con-
gress intended to overrule Miranda because the decision is constitutionally based).
24. Nomination of David H. Souter, supra note 19, at 64.
25. Miranda-related cases are not unique in calling upon Justices to project their practical
assumptions and understandings about people and society into their assessments of constitu-
tional rules. For example, in a stop-and-frisk Fourth Amendment search case in which the ma-
jority of Justices assumed that police officers could reasonably suspect the existence of criminal
evidence or conduct when a person runs away, Justice Stevens expressed an alternative under-
standing about human behavior and social context in American society:
Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime areas,
there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or
without justification, believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart
from any criminal activity associated with the officer's sudden presence. For such a
person, unprovoked flight is neither "aberrant" nor "abnormal."
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 132-33 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. It is widely recognized that in recent decades the members of the Supreme Court have
espoused differing approaches to constitutional interpretation, including advocacy of original-
ism. See Antonin Scalia, Foreward, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 43-45
(Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007). They have also adopted individual approaches to the concept of
"liberty." See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONsTrruiION (2005).
27. The Supreme Court Judicial Database, which is the source of the data and classifications
for this table, defines "liberal" case outcomes as those that are "pro-person accused or convicted
of a crime, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, pro-indigent, pro-[Native American], and
anti-government in due process and privacy." See Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Deci-
sional Trends on the Warren and Burger Courts: Results from the Supreme Court Data Base
Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103, 103 (1989).
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF JUSTICES' SUPPORT FOR INDIVIDUALS'
CLAIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES 2 8 AND
MIRANDA FIFTH AMENDMENT CASES 2 9
Criminal Difference
ProceiureMiranda-Issue iProcedure imL
Marshall 80% 94% [17 cases] +14
Stevens 65% 82% [22 cases] +17
Brennan 76% 81% [16 cases] + 5
Blackmun 42% 35% [17 cases] - 7
Kennedy 30% 33% [ 9 cases] + 3
Powell 29% 25% [12 cases] - 4
Burger 20% 22% [ 9 cases] + 2
O'Connor 27% 19% [16 cases] - 8
White 33% 18% [17 cases] -15
Rehnquist 17% 15% [20 cases] - 2
Scalia 25% 0% [12 cases] -25
Table'1 also provides a measure of how each Justice's voting record
in Miranda cases compared with his or her overall voting record in
criminal procedure cases. The difference between Justices' overall
criminal procedure voting and their Miranda-issue voting may provide
a rough indicator of the extent to which they had particularly strong
or different viewpoints on this Fifth Amendment issue as compared to
other issues in criminal justice.30 Using this measure, Justice Stevens
28. The published compilation of Justices' voting records in criminal procedure cases
summarizes career percentages for the period of the Supreme Court's Terms from 1946 through
2004. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND
DEVELOPMENTS 534-37 (4th ed. 2007).
29. The Miranda issue voting records summarize each Justice's voting during the period of
Justice Stevens's career, from the 1975 Term through the 2009 Term. See HAROLD SPAETH,
SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATA BASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org (last visited Mar. 1,
2011). Using the online analysis functions at http://supremecourtdatabase.org/analysis.php, a
search identified cases classified as "Miranda warnings" for the Terms 1975 through 2008. The
Table represents a manual tabulation of data drawn from the Supreme Court database. Id. The
Table includes only those Justices who participated in nine or more Miranda cases during the
period of Justice Stevens's career. The more recent appointees to the Supreme Court (Chief
Justice John Roberts, Justice Samuel Alito, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor) participated in fewer
Miranda-issue cases. Thus, their vote in a single case could have an overly significant and
potentially distorting impact on their percentages, such as when Justices who have only
participated in five such cases supported individuals in two cases (forty percent) instead of three
cases (sixty percent).
30. Because only four of the eleven Justices presented in the Table have double-digit differ-
ences between their criminal procedure cases in general and Miranda cases specifically, this may
indicate that there is a particular clarity or consistency in their views about this issue. If all of the
Justices had only single-digit differences between the two figures, then one might infer that the
Miranda issue is somewhat undifferentiated from other criminal justice issues and the Justices
treat the Fifth Amendment right in the same or a similar fashion as other rights issues in the
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stands out as a strong supporter of Miranda rights, particularly in light
of his level of support for other criminal justice rights. Justice Mar-
shall also was an especially strong supporter. Conversely, Justice
White, and especially Justice Scalia, were exceptionally strong oppo-
nents of Miranda claims.
Justice White's critical stance on this Fifth Amendment right is not
surprising. He wrote a particularly scathing dissenting opinion that
harshly condemned the potential consequences of Chief Justice Earl
Warren's majority opinion in Miranda.31 Although Justice Scalia is
widely recognized as a critic of certain rights in the criminal justice
system,32 his absolute opposition to Miranda in the cases represented
in this Table is striking in light of his support for other constitutional
rights of criminal defendants.33 Presumably, the extent of his opposi-
tion is related to the fact that Miranda warnings cannot be justified
through the originalist 34 and textualist 35 approaches to constitutional
interpretation which he espouses.
Among the consistent supporters of individuals' Miranda claims,
the high levels of support demonstrated by Justices Marshall and
Brennan seem understandable. Both were members of the Warren
Court and part of the dominant majority on the Court during the era
in which the Supreme Court had its most liberal composition with re-
spect to criminal justice cases.36 Indeed, Justice Brennan's support for
justice system. This should be regarded as an intriguing potential indicator of special interest in
or viewpoints about Miranda, not a scientifically proven demonstration of a specific judicial
viewpoint. Because factual circumstances differ in each case and the Justices only accept a small
number of cases for decision, one must be reluctant to draw firm conclusions from empirical
indicators that rely on a small sample of cases.
31. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) ("In some un-
known number of cases the Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the
streets and to the environment which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him.
As a consequence, there not be a gain, but a loss, in human dignity.").
32. For example, Justice Scalia is a consistent critic of the Supreme Court's application of the
Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to both capital punishment and
prisoners' rights cases. See generally Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal Pun-
ishment: The Emerging Visions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 593 (1995).
33. Justice Scalia supported rights for individuals in cases concerning the Confrontation
Clause, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860-61 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), certain circum-
stances concerning the Fourth Amendment, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), and
speedy probable cause hearings after warrantless arrests, County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500
U.S. 44, 59-63 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall,
Justice Scalia's Influence on Criminal Justice, 34 U. TOL. L. REv. 535, 554 (2003).
34. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856 (1989).
35. See generally Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Right of Confrontation, Justice Scalia, and the
Power and Limits of Textualism, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323 (1991).
36. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 6-7
(1997) (discussing the six-member majority in the later years of the Warren Court composed of
Justices who had liberal voting records in criminal justice cases).
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Miranda rights can be seen as reflecting his defense of the controver-
sial decision in which he was a member of the five-Justice majority in
the original case.37 By contrast, the reasons for Justice Stevens's high
level of support for Miranda rights are less apparent, especially when
one considers that Justice Stevens was a Republican from an affluent
family3 8 who was appointed to the federal bench first by Republican
President Richard Nixon and later elevated to the Supreme Court by
Republican President Gerald Ford.39 These background characteris-
tics for Justice Stevens are not generally considered to be predictors of
liberal judicial decisions in criminal justice cases.40 Moreover, Justice
Stevens's pre-judicial legal career as a private-practice attorney is typi-
cally summarized with the description of him as "a specialist in anti-
trust matters," 41 rather than as a lawyer with interest and experience
in cases involving constitutional rights. Yet, as indicated in Table 1,
Justice Stevens stands out as an exceptionally staunch defender of Mi-
randa rights.42
III. JUSTICE STEVENS: LIFE EXPERIENCE AND
SUPPORT FOR MIRANDA
Scholars who study the Supreme Court attribute Justices' votes and
opinions on specific issues to various personal influences and theories
of judicial decision making. 43 Some scholars make the case for one
primary factor, such as underlying attitudes44 or a specific theory of
37. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
38. See ROBERT JUDD SICKELS, JOHN PAUL STEVENS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SEARCH
FOR BALANCE 1 (1988) ("[He was] a Republican, son of a prominent Republican businessman in
Chicago, [and] named by Republican presidents to the federal court of appeals and then to the
Supreme Court .... ).
39. Justice Stevens was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit by President Richard Nixon in 1970 and to the Supreme Court by President Gerald Ford
in 1975. THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK, supra note 3, at 206.
40. By contrast, liberal jurist Justice Brennan was also appointed by a Republican president
(Eisenhower) but he was a Democrat, and his father was a labor union organizer and a public
official. KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECI-
SIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 19-20, 89-91 (1993).
41. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINT-
MENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 324 (2d ed. 1985).
42. See Table 1, supra notes 28-29.
43. See generally THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003) (describ-
ing the scholars who developed modem theories of judicial decision making).
44. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDI-
NAL MODEL, at xvi (1993) ("Unlike the legal model, our attitudinal model enables us to system-
atically explain-validly and reliably-how the Court operates and why the justices behave as
they do.").
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constitutional interpretation,45 as driving the decision making of Jus-
tices. Other analysts recognize that multiple factors may affect judi-
cial decision making,46 such as when Justices' attitudes, interpretive
theories, and their awareness of external audiences47 interact with
their strategic decisions48 as they confront legal issues. In addition,
Justices' life experiences can be seen as an overarching influence that
affects the development of attitudes and values, shapes interpretive
theories, and defines audiences of importance to individual judicial
decisionmakers.49 Supreme Court Justices may themselves acknowl-
edge the impact of life experiences, such as when Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor said,
We're all creatures of our upbringing. We bring whatever we are as
people to a job like the Supreme Court. We have our life exper-
iences. For example, for me it was growing up on a remote ranch in
the West. If something broke, you'd have to fix it yourself. The
solution didn't always have to look beautiful, but it had to work. So
that made me a little more pragmatic than some other justices. I
liked to find solutions that would work....
45. See Christopher E. Smith, Bent on Original Intent, 82 A.B.A.J., Oct. 1996, at 48 ("This
does not mean that his opinions are either completely consistent or flawless in their reasoning.
But Thomas distinguishes himself by . . . consistently advocat[ing] the strict application of key
tools for interpreting the Constitution: its text and history.").
46. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 7 (1997) ("Explanations of
Supreme Court behavior that treat the justices basically as isolated individuals can be quite use-
ful. But no complete explanation of the justices' behavior could leave aside their interactions
with colleagues on the Court.").
47. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BE-
HAVIOR 23 (2006).
I believe that judges' motivation to win the approval of their audiences can explain a
good deal about their choices as decision makers, and I seek to demonstrate that ex-
planatory value. But even more important is the value of thinking about judges and
their audiences as a means to develop new understandings of judicial behavior.
Id.
48. See THOMAS H. HAMMOND, CHRIS W. BONNEAU & REGINALD S. SHEEHAN, STRATEGIC
BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 24 (2005) ("Our own model of
decision-making by strategically rational justices will demonstrate that the location of the status
quo policy has a major impact on what final policy is chosen and on the sizes of the coalitions
supporting and opposing this final policy.").
49. Biographers who study Supreme Court Justices often identify ways in which life exper-
iences, including family upbringing and career paths, shape values and worldviews that ulti-
mately guide judicial decision making. See, for example, JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL:
THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 31 (2009), which
states,
Molded by his Italian roots, yet fully assimilated, the young man with the intellectual
father and classical training embraced the world of rules. He found it ballast in the
rough seas of changing social values. Legal work offered Scalia, he would later say, an
identity tied to precision and reverence for the text.
Id.
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It's important for the Supreme Court to have a broader set of life
experiences than just people who have served as judges.50
Indeed, Justice Stevens has-more so than other Justices-explicitly
acknowledged the impact of life experiences on his performance as a
judge, as when he said in a 2010 interview, "I've confessed to many
people that I think my personal experience has had an impact on what
I've done.... Time and time again, not only for myself but for other
people on the [C]ourt, during discussions of cases you bring up exper-
iences that you are familiar with."51 When one examines the life ex-
periences of Justice Stevens, the apparent basis for his strong support
of Miranda rights emerges from events during his years as a law clerk,
attorney, and judge.
A. Personal Knowledge and the Perceived Risk of
Police Misbehavior
Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in Miranda made it clear
that protective warnings were required as a means to prevent abusive
interrogation practices by the police. 52 The opinion described a then-
recent example of the use of violence by police when seeking informa-
tion and questioning someone in custody:
The use of physical brutality and violence is not, unfortunately,
relegated to the past or to any part of the country. Only recently in
Kings County, New York, the police brutally beat, kicked and
placed lighted cigarette butts on the back of a potential witness
under interrogation for the purpose of securing a statement incrimi-
nating a third party.53
Chief Justice Warren was keenly aware of the risk of abusive police
tactics, in part, because his generation had grown into adulthood when
the nation's police departments were typically unprofessional, poorly
50. Walter Isaacson, A Justice Reflects, THE DAILY BEAST (June 29, 2009), http://www.the
dailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-06-29/a-justice-reflects/.
51. Adam Liptak, At 89, Stevens Contemplates the Law, and How to Leave It, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2010, at 1.
52. The Court explained,
The difficulty in depicting what transpires at such interrogations stems from the fact
that in this country, they have largely taken place incommunicado. From extensive fac-
tual studies undertaken in the early 1930's, including the famous Wickersham Report to
Congress by a Presidential Commission, it is clear that police violence and the "third
degree" flourished at that time. In a series of cases decided by this Court long after
these studies, the police resorted to physical brutality-beating, hanging, whipping-
and to sustained and protracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort confes-
sions. The Commission on Civil Rights in 1961 found much evidence to indicate that
"some policemen still resort to physical force to obtain confessions."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1966).
53. Id. at 446 (citing People v. Portelli, 205 N.E.2d 857 (N.Y. 1965)).
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trained, and accustomed to exercising coercive authority with near ab-
solute discretion. 54 As a prosecutor in California during the 1920s and
1930s, Warren saw firsthand the problems of unprofessional police
mistreating suspects, employing untrustworthy informants, and engag-
ing in corruption.55
The other Warren Court Justices who, like Chief Justice Warren,
were most supportive of expanded rights each had specific knowledge
of the risks of police misbehavior from witnessing this era of non-pro-
fessional policing. 56 For example, Justice Brennan's biographer de-
scribed a personal experience of police abuse that caused an enduring
memory for the consistent advocate of strong rights and clear limits on
police authority:
A turning point in the life of the Brennan family came in 1916 when
ten-year-old Bill junior witnessed his father being carried into the
house by union brothers, bloodied and beaten by city police after a
particularly bitter union battle over the trolley-car drivers. Few
events in his childhood affected him more. Police beatings would
never be anything abstract to the Brennans.57
Similarly, Thurgood Marshall-who courageously defended African-
American defendants throughout the South during the 1940s5 8-was
arrested under false pretenses by Tennessee police officers intent on
delivering him to a lynch mob.59 Fortunately, the officers, who had
already driven Marshall off the road and toward the waiting mob,
changed their minds when they realized that witnesses might be able
to describe their involvement in Marshall's murder.60 In yet another
54. See Christopher E. Smith, Police Professionalism and the Rights of Criminal Defendants,
26 CRIM. L. BULL. 155, 155-156 (1990).
55. See CRAY, supra note 11, at 38-41.
56. See SMITH, supra note 36, at 35-37.
57. EISLER, supra note 40, at 19.
58. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE Su-
PREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 42-66 (1994).
59. Id. at 54-55 ("Marshall and Looby left Columbia, with Marshall driving. After a few
minutes they heard police sirens behind them and pulled over. Three carloads of police officers
emptied and ordered Marshall and Looby out of the car, so that, as the officers said, they could
search for liquor.... [T]he search turned up nothing.... Looby told Marshall that Looby would
take over the driving. . . . [The police] asked to see the driver's licenses and 'called out the
names.' When Marshall's was called, someone in the crowd said, 'That's the one.' Marshall was
arrested for driving while drunk, even though he was no longer driving the car. He told them
that he had not had a drink in two days. . . . The officers took Marshall in one police car and
began to drive down a side road. Looby followed in his car, and, when the officers failed to
persuade Looby to stop following them, the cars went to Columbia.").
60. See JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 139-40
(1998).
Marshall was pushed into the backseat of an unmarked police car.
The police did not want any eyewitnesses.. . . [Looby] watched with growing horror
as the car turned off the highway and headed down a dirt road toward the river. Un-
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example, William 0. Douglas's autobiography describes his exper-
iences in Yakima, Washington, observing the police mistreat poor peo-
ple. This led Justice Douglas to write, "I knew their victims too
intimately to align myself with the police."ol
As indicated by the divided vote in Miranda itself,62 not all Su-
preme Court Justices from this generation perceived the same risks of
police misbehavior. These differing perceptions could stem from less
contact with and awareness about unprofessional police, 63 doubts
about the propriety or efficacy of particular judicially developed rules
aimed at curbing police misconduct, 64 or fidelity to an interpretive ap-
proach that did not support these judicially created rules or
guidelines. 65
daunted by their threats, Looby followed the police car.... Speaking slowly out of fear,
Looby said that he wasn't leaving until he saw Marshall. . . . [T]o his surprise, the
policeman stomped away to talk with others in the car. The police were worried that
even if Looby were to leave then, there would be witnesses to the fact that Marshall
had not been driven back to town. . . . The policeman got back in the car. To turn
around they had to drive closer to the river, and that was when Marshall, from his
uncomfortable perch in the backseat, saw an angry group of men waiting by the water.
But the police car did not stop.
61. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 78 (1974).
62. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was decided on a five-to-four vote with the
majority consisting of Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices Hugo Black, William Brennan,
William 0. Douglas, and Abe Fortas, and the dissenting side composed of Justices Tom Clark,
John Harlan, Potter Stewart, and Byron White.
63. Justice Harlan grew up in "a distinguished, old, upper-class family." See Wallace Mendel-
son, Justice John Marshall Harlan: Non sub Homine . . ., in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL
AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 193, 193 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991). He
worked primarily for a Wall Street law firm with some periods of service as a prosecutor after
studying at Princeton and Oxford. See THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK, supra note 3, at 198.
He may not have had unpleasantly illuminating contacts with the police. Because his father was
a member of the Cincinnati City Council and later became mayor of Cincinnati and a justice on
the Ohio Supreme Court, Potter Stewart may also have missed gaining personal contact with and
skepticism about abusive police practices. See Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Justice Potter Stewart: Deci-
sional Patterns in Search of Doctrinal Moorings, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDI-
CIAL PROFILES, supra, at 375, 376.
64. In his Miranda dissent, for example, Justice White expressed opposition to the propriety of
the new rules created in the majority's decision. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 542 (White, J., dissent-
ing) ("There is, in my view, every reason to believe that a good many criminal defendants who
otherwise would have been convicted on what this Court has previously thought to be the most
satisfactory kind of evidence will now, under this new version of the Fifth Amendment, either
not be tried at all or will be acquitted if the State's evidence, minus the confession, is put to the
test of litigation. I have no desire whatsoever to share the responsibility for any such impact on
the present criminal process.").
65. In the Fourth Amendment context, Justice Harlan's conception of federalism served as
one basis for his opposition to the application of the exclusionary rule to the states. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The preservation of a proper balance
between state and federal responsibility in the administration of criminal justice demands pa-
tience on the part of those who might like to see things move faster among the States in this
respect.").
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How should Justice Stevens be classified with respect to his life ex-
periences and perceptions about the risk of police misconduct? It
seems clear that Justice Stevens shares the generational vantage point
of the Miranda majority members who grew up in the era of unprofes-
sional policing,66 based in part on his own personal knowledge. 67 Al-
though Justice Stevens was younger than the members of the Miranda
majority,68 he grew up in Chicago, which was known for abusive po-
lice practices up through the 1980s.6 9 In his public speeches, Justice
Stevens discussed his knowledge of police brutality in Chicago.70 In
one speech referring to the 1930s in Chicago, Justice Stevens said, "At
that time, less prosperous criminals were sometimes treated brutally
by Chicago police officers seeking confessions of guilt."7' This decla-
ration seems directly connected to the underlying concerns of Mi-
randa-related cases. In another speech, Justice Stevens spoke of
police misconduct in a case in which he represented a convicted of-
fender: "It was a few years after my graduation [from law school], in
the course of the pro bono representation of an inmate who had been
66. As indicated in Table 1, supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text, Justice Stevens's strong
support for Miranda rights is most similar in consistency to the voting records of Justices Mar-
shall and Brennan whose generational life experiences made them skeptical about the risks of
abusive police behavior. See supra notes 56-61.
67. See Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens and Prisoners' Rights, 17 TEMP. POL.
& Civ. RTs. L. REV. 83, 98-100 (2007).
68. Justice Stevens was born in 1920, while the Miranda majority members were born in 1886
(Justice Black), 1891 (Chief Justice Warren), 1898 (Justice Douglas), 1906 (Justice Brennan), and
1910 (Justice Fortas). See THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK, supra note 3, at 188, 190, 197, 199,
202, 206.
69. See Jodi Rudoren, Inquiry Finds Police Abuse, but Says Law Bars Trials, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 2006, at A14 ("Special prosecutors said Wednesday that scores of criminal suspects were
routinely brutalized by police officers on the South Side of Chicago in the 1970's and 1980's
.... "). Another article reported more Chicago police brutality:
[SIcores of criminal suspects, many poor and black, have come forward saying they
were routinely brutalized by Mr. Burge and the mostly white officers under his com-
mand on the South Side in the 1980s.
According to the indictment, Mr. Burge "well knew" he had participated in and was
aware of "such events involving the abuse or torture of people in custody," including
wrapping inmates' heads in plastic to make them feel as if they were suffocating.
Susan Saulny & Eric Ferkenhoff, Ex-Officer Linked to Brutality Is Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2008, at A16.
70. See Smith, supra note 67, at 99-100.
71. John Paul Stevens, Keynote Address at the University of Chicago Law Review Sympo-
sium: The Bill of Rights, A Century of Progress (Oct. 25, 1991), in 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 13, 15 &
n.7 (1992).
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in prison since 1937, that I learned that some of those interrogations
did, in fact, involve brutal and indefensible police conduct." 72
Justice Stevens was referring to People v. La Frana,3 a case in
which he helped free from prison a man who had served seventeen
years after being tortured by Chicago police into confessing to a mur-
der that he did not commit. As described by the Illinois Supreme
Court, La Frana was hung from a door by his handcuffed wrists and
beaten until he lost consciousness. 74 Eventually, he agreed to sign a
confession.75 Justice Stevens referred to his memories of what hap-
pened to his client, La Frana, when he said, "What I learned from that
case has no doubt had an impact on my work on the Supreme
Court." 7 6 In light of the number of brief references to this case in his
speeches, it seems reasonable to presume that La Frana's victimiza-
tion at the hands of the police is an important, unforgettable memory
that Justice Stevens recalled when he confronted cases raising Mi-
randa-related questions about protecting suspects from improper po-
lice coercion during questioning.
Although not directly related to Miranda cases, other experiences
in his judicial career provided Justice Stevens with an awareness of the
risks of abusive police behavior. His knowledge of these risks could
very well affect his determination in Miranda-issue cases to impose
clear, strong limits on police behavior. For example, during his tenure
as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit from
1970 to 1975,77 then-Judge Stevens wrote an opinion in a highly publi-
cized civil rights lawsuit in which Chicago police officers were accused
of intentionally shooting and killing the leaders of the local Black Pan-
72. John Paul Stevens, Judicial Activism: Ensuring the Powers and Freedoms Conceived by
the Framers for Today's World, Address at the Third Annual John Paul Stevens Award Dinner
(Sept. 25, 2002), in 16 CBA RECORD 25, 25 (2002).
73. People v. La Frana, 122 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. 1954).
74. The La Frana court stated,
According to defendant's testimony, when he refused to confess the captain hit him
repeatedly with his fists and with a night stick. His hands were then handcuffed behind
him and he was blindfolded. A rope was put in between the handcuffs and he was
suspended from a door with his hands behind him and his feet almost off the floor.
While he was hanging from the door, he was repeatedly struck until he lapsed into
unconsciousness. When he lost consciousness he was taken down from the door and
when he regained consciousness he would be hung back up on the door and again
questioned and struck. After about fifteen minutes of this treatment he agreed to sign




76. John Paul Stevens, Random Recollections, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269, 270 (2005).
77. THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK, supra note 3, at 206.
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ther Party.78 In a predawn raid in 1969, more than a dozen police
officers entered the apartment where the Black Panthers were sleep-
ing and fired more than eighty rounds, killing Fred Hampton and
Mark Clark, arresting others present at the apartment, and charging
them with attempted murder for allegedly firing at the police. 79 In the
civil lawsuit that eventually followed, the U.S. district judge dismissed
claims against various defendants, including Mayor Richard Daley, Sr.
and the prosecutors who allegedly helped to plan the raid.80 On be-
half of a unanimous Seventh Circuit panel, the opinion by Judge Ste-
vens reversed the district court decision with respect to several
defendants. The court permitted the lawsuit to proceed against the
prosecutors and the police officers who investigated the raid, in addi-
tion to the fourteen officers who had been at the scene of the raid 8 -
the only defendants who had failed to convince the district court to
dismiss the claims against them. 8 2 The case concluded nine years later
when the government paid a settlement of nearly $2 million to the
survivors.83 In light of such experiences, it is clear that for Justice Ste-
vens, like Justices Brennan 84 and Marshall,85 the risk of abusive police
behavior was real and not merely a remote, hypothetical possibility.
B. The Importance of Representation by Counsel and the
Adversary System
A core element of Miranda warnings is notice to suspects in custody
that they have a right to be represented by counsel during questioning
and to have counsel appointed if they cannot afford their own coun-
sel.8 6 This core element presumably had special importance to Justice
78. Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973).
79. See John Kifner, Informers: A Tale in Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1995, at 4E; Jo Napoli-
tano, Edward Hanrahan, 88, Prosecutor Tied to '69 Panthers Raid, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2009, at
B15.
80. Hampton v. City of Chicago, 339 F. Supp. 695, 698-99 (N.D. Ill. 1972), rev'd, 484 F.2d 602
(7th Cir. 1973).
81. Hampton, 484 F.2d at 602.
82. Hampton, 339 F. Supp. at 700-01.
83. Cook County Board Approves Settlement for Panther Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1982, at
A18.
84. EISLER, supra note 40, at 19.
85. WILLIAMS, supra note 60, at 139-40.
86. The Miranda Court stated,
Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed
that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during
interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege [against compelled self-in-
crimination] we delineate today. . ..
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Stevens because, in the later years of the Rehnquist Court87 and early
years of the Roberts Court, he "[stood] out among the Justices as per-
haps the foremost advocate of the right to counsel."88 His strong ad-
vocacy of representation by legal counsel and the adversary system is
evident in many of his opinions, 89 and moreover, he insisted that
"[tlhe pretrial right to counsel is not ancillary to, or of lesser impor-
tance than, the right to rely on counsel at trial." 90
His unforgettable experience in obtaining freedom for La Frana
presumably demonstrated to Justice Stevens the importance of effec-
tive legal representation as well as the risks of police abuse.91 In addi-
tion, it is likely that his earlier formative experience as a law clerk for
Justice Wiley Rutledge during the Supreme Court's 1947 Term also
shaped his views on the importance of the right to counsel.92
Custodial questioning and right to counsel issues arose in a number
of cases while then-law clerk Stevens was researching legal issues and
writing memoranda for Justice Rutledge. Two cases during that Term
directly raised Miranda-type situations involving African-American
teenagers, one in Ohio 93 and one in Mississippi, 94 whose confessions
may have been coerced. Justice Rutledge was a member of the major-
ity in each case as the Supreme Court challenged the voluntariness of
the confessions, reversing the lower court decisions that had sustained
In order to fully apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this
system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to counsel with an
attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appoint to represent him.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471, 473 (1966).
87. In earlier years, Justices other than Stevens, such as Brennan and Marshall, sometimes
endorsed the broadest views of the protective scope of the right to counsel. See, e.g., Perry v.
Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989) (Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun dissented against a Jus-
tice Stevens-authored majority opinion that rejected a Sixth Amendment claim when a trial
judge prevented a defendant from consulting with his attorney during a brief recess at the trial);
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (ineffective assistance of counsel case in which Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Powell dissented against a Stevens-authored majority opin-
ion that rejected the petitioner's claim).
88. Christopher E. Smith, The Roles of Justice John Paul Stevens in Criminal Justice Cases, 39
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 719, 736 (2006).
89. See id. at 736-38.
90. Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1848 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
92. See Laura Krugman Ray, Clerk and Justice: The Ties That Bind John Paul Stevens and
Wiley B. Rutledge, 41 CONN. L. REV. 211, 214-15 (2008) ("The example of Justice Rutledge and
Justice Stevens offers a particularly intriguing field of study.... [I]t nonetheless reveals the ways
in which a clerkship of a single year may affect not only the future jurisprudence but also the
institutional behavior of a clerk turned Justice.").
93. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
94. Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948).
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the convictions. 95 The description by Justice Douglas of the majority's
conclusions in the Ohio case demonstrated that Rutledge and other
like-minded Justices during that Term were concerned about the very
issues that the Warren Court would address with its bright-line rule in
Miranda (nearly two decades later):
The age of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration
of his quizzing, the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise
him, the callous attitude of the police towards his rights combine to
convince us that this was a confession wrung from a child by means
which the law should not sanction. Neither man nor child can be
allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional
requirements of due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the police from using the private, secret custody of either
man or child as a device for wringing confessions from them.96
As for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases, at that moment
in history the right was guided by Betts v. Brady,97 which required
appointed counsel for indigent defendants in state cases only when
special circumstances prevented them from representing themselves. 98
The Court was still nearly fifteen years away from making a uniform
rule requiring appointment of counsel for all indigent defendants fac-
ing serious charges,99 and thus many petitioners brought claims in the
1947 Term when they did not receive the benefit of counsel. Justice
Stevens inevitably had intimate exposure to the issues and the law-
yers' briefs as he watched his mentor, Justice Rutledge, consistently
support a broader definition of the right to counsel.100 For example,
the Rutledge Papers at the Library of Congress reveal that a memo-
randum written by Justice Stevens provided key language that Justice
Rutledge used to criticize the post-conviction judicial processes in Illi-
nois.' 0 ' The case concerned a teenage Italian immigrant who spoke
95. See Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 ("We do not think the methods used in obtaining this confes-
sion can be squared with that due process of law which the Fourteenth Amendment com-
mands."); Lee, 332 U.S. at 745-46 ("[F]oreclosure of the right to complain 'of a wrong so
fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and rendered the
conviction and sentence wholly void,'. . . would itself be a denial of due process of law." (citation
omitted)).
96. Haley, 332 U.S. at 600-01.
97. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
98. Id. at 471-73.
99. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
100. See JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF
JUSTICE WILEY RUTLEDGE 352 (2004) ("Beginning in the 1945 Term, Rutledge began what
eventually became a campaign to assure criminal defendants a truly effective right to counsel in
state as well as federal courts.").
101. Diane Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens, Human Rights Judge, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
1569, 1590 (2006).
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no English and had no attorney but was convicted of murder and
given a life sentence.102
In another case during that Term, Justice Rutledge joined the ma-
jority opinion that concluded representation by counsel was essential
to a fair proceeding in order to avoid the use of erroneous records for
sentencing.10 3 He also joined an opinion by Justice Murphy in a
habeas corpus case declaring that when an individual has an "incapac-
ity" to represent himself in court, "the refusal to appoint counsel is a
denial of due process of law." 1 0 4 In another example, Justice Rutledge
joined Justice Black's opinion finding that a Detroit housewife ac-
cused of being a German spy during World War II "was entitled to
counsel other than that given her by Government [law enforcement]
agents... . [and] [s]he [was] still entitled to that counsel before her life
or her liberty [were] taken from her."105 And, in a dissent joined by
Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, Justice Rutledge expressed his
dissatisfaction with the then-existing rule that limited the requirement
of appointed counsel to indigent defendants who were classified by
trial judges as having a special inability to represent themselves in
court.1 0 6 In Justice Rutledge's words,
Perhaps the difference serves only to illustrate how capricious are
the results when the right to counsel is made to depend not upon
the mandate of the Constitution, but upon the vagaries of whether
judges, the same or different, will regard this incident or that in the
course of particular criminal proceedings as prejudicial. 107
Thus, Justice Stevens clerked for a Justice who dealt with a number of
right to counsel issues and who saw representation by counsel as es-
sential to fair proceedings. Moreover, Justice Rutledge advocated
broader availability of defense counsel for indigent criminal
defendants.
Nearly thirty years later, as a Supreme Court nominee, Stevens
spoke with great clarity about his view of the importance of legal rep-
resentation in criminal justice cases:
Senator [John] Tunney [(D-Calif)]: Do you have anything that you
would care to express on the general subject of right to counsel that
might help the committee in any future action?
102. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 562 (1947).
103. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) ("In this case, counsel might not have
changed the sentence, but he could have taken steps to see that the conviction and sentence were
not predicated on misinformation or misreading of court records, a requirement of fair play
which absence of counsel withheld from this prisoner.").
104. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 684 (1948).
105. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 726 (1948).




Judge Stevens: Yes; I don't hesitate in saying that I think one of the
most important aspects of procedural fairness is availability of coun-
sel to the litigant on either side. I could not overemphasize the im-
portance of the lawyer's role in the adversary process and it is
unquestionably a matter of major importance in all litigation. 08
The subsequent judicial opinions written by Justice Stevens rein-
forced this statement from his confirmation testimony. In Penson v.
Ohio,109 a Justice Stevens-authored majority opinion found that a con-
victed offender had been denied adequate representation when his at-
torney ignored potentially arguable claims and asserted that there was
no basis for an appeal.' 10 Justice Stevens wrote, "It bears emphasis
that the right to be represented by counsel is among the most funda-
mental rights. We have long recognized that 'lawyers in criminal
courts are necessities, not luxuries.'. . . As a general matter, it is
through counsel that all other rights of the accused are protected."'
He also declared that "[tihe paramount importance of vigorous repre-
sentation follows from the nature of our adversarial system of justice.
This system is premised on the well-tested principle that truth-as
well as fairness-is 'best discovered by powerful statements on both
sides of the question."'112
In United States v. Cronic,113 a case that established standards for
evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel,114 Justice Stevens wrote,
An accused's right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental
component of our criminal justice system. [The presence of law-
yers] is essential because they are the means through which the
rights of the person on trial are secured. Without counsel, the right
to a trial itself would be "of little avail," as this Court has recog-
nized repeatedly. "Of all the rights that an accused person has, the
right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it
affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have."115
Even outside the realm of criminal justice, Justice Stevens insisted
that representation by counsel was essential in our adversary sys-
108. Nomination of John Paul Stevens to be a Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearings Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 78 (1975) (testimony of John Paul Stevens, Nominee,
United States Supreme Court).
109. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
110. Id. at 75.
111. Id. at 84 (quoting Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)).
112. Id. (quoting Irving R. Kaufman, Does the Judge Have a Right to Qualified Counsel?, 61
A.B.A.J., Jan. 1975, at 569).
113. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
114. Id. at 665 ("Respondent can therefore make out a claim of ineffective assistance only by
pointing to specific errors made by trial counsel.").
115. Id. at 653-54 (citations omitted).
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tem.116 His description of "the function of the independent lawyer as
a guardian of our freedom" conveyed his view of the unparalleled im-
portance of attorneys in the American civil justice system.1 1 7 He reit-
erated this point by writing that "the citizen's right to consult with an
independent lawyer and to retain that lawyer to speak on his or her
behalf is an aspect of liberty that is priceless."118 Beginning with his
very first Term on the Court, Justice Stevens espoused an expansive
view of liberty as a "cardinal [and] unalienable" natural right.119 By
linking representation by counsel with this most important of rights,
he demonstrated the strength of his belief in counsel's essential role.
In another example-a case concerning an indigent woman seeking
a right to representation when fighting the termination of parental
rights-Justice Stevens emphatically reasserted his view.1 2 0 He char-
acterized representation by counsel as a matter of "fundamental fair-
ness" 121 and as essential to the protection of the "priceless" right to
liberty that is safeguarded by the Due Process Clause. 122
In my opinion, the reasons supporting the conclusion that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles the de-
fendant in a criminal case to representation by counsel apply with
equal force to a case of this kind. The issue is one of fundamental
fairness, not of weighing the pecuniary costs against the societal
benefits. Accordingly, even if the costs to the State were not rela-
tively insignificant but rather were just as great as the costs of pro-
viding prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel to ensure the
fairness of criminal proceedings, I would reach the same result in
this category of cases. For the value of protecting our liberty from
deprivation by the State without due process of law is priceless.12 3
In seeking new ways to repeatedly assert and emphasize his argu-
ment about the supreme importance of representation, Justice Stevens
even drew from his original vocational aspiration to become a profes-
sor of literature1 2 4 by using Shakespeare to highlight the necessity of
116. See Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 358-59 (1985) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (concerning the opportunity to retain private counsel in cases involving disputes
about veterans' benefits).
117. Id. at 371.
118. Id.
119. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I had thought it
self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal
unalienable rights.").
120. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 59 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 60.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 59-60.
124. Justice Stevens began work on a master's degree in English at the University of Chicago
prior to becoming an officer in the U.S. Navy in World War II. KENNETH A. MANASTER, ILLI-
NOIS JUSTICE: THE SCANDAL OF 1969 AND THE RISE OF JOHN PAUL STEVENS 38 (2001). He
2010] 117
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
legal counsel. In referencing the famous line from the play Henry VI,
Part II, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers,"1 25 Justice
Stevens explained, "As a careful reading of that text will reveal,
Shakespeare insightfully realized that disposing of lawyers is a step in
the direction of a totalitarian form of government." 26
IV. STEVENS AS JURIST IN MIRANDA CASES
As indicated by the foregoing discussion, life experiences appar-
ently contributed to Justice Stevens's concerns about the risks of abu-
sive police behavior as well as his strong advocacy for the adversary
system and the necessity of counsel for the protection of rights and the
preservation of liberty. Justice Stevens has reportedly acknowledged,
for example, that his life experiences growing up in Chicago taught
him "that the criminal justice system can misfire sometimes." 127 Just
as his awareness and concern are evident in his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel opinions,128 they are also evident in his decisions and
opinions concerning Miranda issues.
A. Miranda Issues and Judge Stevens on the Seventh Circuit
While serving on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
(1970-1975), then-Judge Stevens served on panels that considered Mi-
randa and right to counsel issues. These cases indicate that he pos-
sessed significant concerns about protecting the rights of suspects
questioned while in custody and was more inclined than some of his
Seventh Circuit colleagues to find that police officers had violated a
suspect's Miranda rights.
In United States v. Springer,129 a bank robbery suspect challenged
the admissibility of his confession because, after an attorney had been
initially planned to resume his graduate studies in English after the war but entered law school
instead because an older brother encouraged him to study law. Id. Justice Stevens continued to
demonstrate his knowledge and keen interest in English literature, not only with literary refer-
ences in his opinions, see Walters, 473 U.S. at 371 n.24 (Stevens, J., dissenting), but also by, for
example, giving a speech that drew from Shakespeare to explain the canons of statutory con-
struction, John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L.
REv. 1373 (1992), serving as a judge in mock trials challenging Shakespeare's authorship credits,
and conducting his own independent research about Shakespeare. Jess Bravin, Justice Stevens
Renders an Opinion on Who Wrote Shakespeare's Plays, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2009, at 1.
125. Walters, 473 U.S. at 371 n.24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2, line 72).
126. Id.
127. Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007 (Magazine) (quoting Justice
Stevens).
128. See supra notes 108-26 and accompanying text.
129. United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1972).
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appointed to represent him at his preliminary appearance in court,
FBI agents questioned him and induced him to sign a waiver of rights
without notifying his attorney.130 The two-member majority on the
Seventh Circuit panel ruled against the defendant, holding that the
defendant had failed to "present some facts tending to show that the
waiver was not voluntary or knowledgeable." 131 By contrast, Stevens
wrote a dissenting opinion in which he asserted that the FBI agents
had violated the principles of the right to counsel during custodial
questioning, notwithstanding the existence of a waiver of rights signed
by the defendant. 132 Indeed, while the majority considered the signed
waiver "sufficient to raise a presumption of validity and shift the bur-
den of going forward to the accused,"133 Stevens regarded that same
waiver signed by the defendant without counsel present as evidence
that the defendant did not understand that he was waiving his
rights.134 According to Stevens, "[t]he fact that the agents had the
defendant sign a standard waiver of rights form on May 18 after coun-
sel had been appointed provides affirmative evidence that he did not
fully grasp the significance of the procedural situation in which he
found himself."135 Stevens's dissenting opinion strongly asserted his
viewpoint about the importance of defense counsel as an essential ac-
tor for ensuring the fairness of criminal justice processes:
After counsel had been appointed to represent him, and while he
was in custody, the defendant was visited by two agents of the pros-
ecutor. Defense counsel was not present and received no advance
notice of their proposed visit. The sole purpose of the visit was to
obtain evidence for use at trial....
In a civil context I would consider this behavior unethical and
unfair. In a criminal context I regard it as such a departure from
"procedural regularity" as to violate the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. If the evidence of guilt is as strong as the prose-
cutor contends, such direct communication is all the more offensive
because it was unnecessary. If there is doubt about defendant's
guilt, it should not be overcome by a procedure such as this.136
In United States v. Fowler,137 Stevens was a member of a Seventh
Circuit panel that examined the case of a teenager who was arrested
and questioned by a postal inspector at a police station for allegedly
130. Id. at 1347.
131. Id. at 1349.
132. Id at 1354 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1349 (majority opinion).
134. Id. at 1355 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1354-55.
137. United States v. Fowler, 476 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1973).
2010] 119
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
burglarizing a post office.s 38 Although Stevens did not write the
court's opinion, he was one of the two judges constituting the panel
majority that concluded that the teenager had a right to be given Mi-
randa warnings1 39 under the principles of In re Gault.140 Over the dis-
sent of one panel member, Stevens and his colleague concluded that
the youth's confession should not have been admitted into evidence
against him because it appeared that, although he was given warnings,
he had not been fully and properly apprised of his Miranda rights. 141
For example, the postal inspector's trial testimony indicated that he
did not warn the teenager that any responses to questions could be
used as evidence of guilt. 1 42 The description of the facts in Judge Ki-
ley's majority opinion appeared to fit precisely with the concerns that
Stevens held about the risk of police abuse and necessity of represen-
tation by counsel:
When his confession was made Fowler was sixteen years of age. So
far as the record shows he had not previously been arrested, had not
previously been in jail, nor had he ever been interrogated by law
enforcement officials. One need only recall his own adolescence to
appreciate the impact upon this boy, alone in a jail room, in custody
of a postal inspector, being warned of his constitutional rights.... In
these circumstances it is difficult to accept the notion that defendant
fully comprehended what he was being told. 143
It is especially noteworthy that in this empathetic description of an
inexperienced, frightened teenager in the disorienting context of cus-
todial questioning, Judge Kiley quoted the Supreme Court's decision
in Haley v. Ohio,144-a Miranda-related case with which then-Judge
Stevens was presumably familiar because it was decided by the Court
during the 1947 Term when he clerked for Justice Rutledge. 145 In his
own opinions 46 and speeches, 147 Justice Stevens has a penchant for
citing cases with which he has had direct involvement. 148 Thus, Judge
138. Id. at 1092.
139. Id. at 1093.
140. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (initiating the extension of constitutional rights to juveniles
in delinquency cases).
141. Fowler, 476 F.2d at 1093.
142. Id. at 1092.
143. Id. at 1093.
144. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
145. See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
146. See sources cited infra note 170.
147. See sources cited supra notes 70-72.
148. For example, in Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990), a case concerning the use for
impeachment purposes of a statement obtained improperly during custodial police questioning,
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion cited and quoted, without noting the identity of the author,
his own majority opinion in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), a case concerning a
different legal issue, ineffective assistance of counsel. Harvey, 494 U.S. at 357 (Stevens, J., dis-
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Kiley's prominent use of the Haley case may be evidence of input by
then-Judge Stevens into the content of the majority opinion.
Stevens wrote the majority opinion for a unanimous Seventh Circuit
panel in United States v. Oliver.149 Oliver was under investigation by
the IRS for understating his income on his tax returns.150 Having
learned that Oliver was present in the Milwaukee Federal Building,
IRS agents asked him to come to their offices and proceeded to inter-
view him.151 They provided him with a limited warning about his
rights, but as Stevens concluded in the opinion, "[T]he warnings did
not include advice that Oliver could remain silent or that he could
have a lawyer present during the interview." 152 During the interview,
"a person who purported to have a message for [the] defendant from
his attorney was not permitted to communicate with [the] defendant
... ."1 The case hinged on the issue of whether Oliver's liberty was
significantly restrained during the interview and whether he was obli-
gated to answer questions for purposes of Miranda,154 as well as the
implications of questioning a suspect who was the focus of an ongoing
investigation.155 Oliver would have lost if the panel had simply de-
clared that he was free to leave but voluntarily chose not to do so.
One could conclude that Miranda warnings were not required because
Oliver had come to the office voluntarily, was not placed under arrest,
and was presumed to know, like other citizens of average knowledge
and intelligence, that people are entitled to terminate an encounter
with law enforcement officers during questioning when not legally
senting) ("[F]or it is an elementary premise of our system of criminal justice 'that partisan advo-
cacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted
and the innocent go free."' (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 655)). The citation to Justice Stevens's
opinion was arguably a bit gratuitous since the citation pointed to a quotation presented by
Justice Stevens in Cronic that was drawn from an earlier case, Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853
(1975). Thus, Justice Stevens could have cited and quoted the Herring opinion directly had he
not wished, for whatever reason, to steer attention to his own later opinion in Cronic. Justice
Stevens also cited his own majority opinion in Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988), a case
concerning yet another issue, the right to counsel on a first appeal of right. Presumably, Justice
Stevens's citation to multiple cases was intended to strengthen the sense that the Court had
repeatedly emphasized the importance of the right to counsel in prior cases.
149. United States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974).
150. Id. at 303.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 306.
153. Id. at 304.
154. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 218 (2003) ("The Miranda warnings
apply only to custodial interrogations. If police officers walk up to someone on the streets and
begin asking questions, there is no need to inform the person of his or her rights.").
155. Oliver, 505 F.2d at 305-06.
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confined to that location. 156 Instead, Stevens interpreted the factual
context and applied the law to conclude that "[t]he incriminating evi-
dence obtained from [Oliver's] interrogation was inadmissible."15 7
According to Stevens,
In this case it is plain that the purpose of the agents' interrogation
of the defendant was to develop evidence which would secure his
conviction of a crime. The criminal investigation of Oliver had com-
menced several months before he was questioned, and there was no
ambiguity about the agents' mission. No doubt . . . Oliver was free
to leave at any time, and therefore not strictly in custody. But since
the agents were in a position to intercept a message from his attor-
ney, and actually did so, it is appropriate, for the purpose of apply-
ing the Miranda test, to characterize the situation as one in which
defendant's liberty was significantly restrained.' 58
These three Seventh Circuit cases in which then-Judge Stevens de-
fended Miranda-type rights do not prove that he reflexively or ideo-
logically supported claims by defendants in every context. Indeed, he
did not. In the Oliver case, he rejected the defendant's second claim
that "his conviction must be reversed because the Fifth Amendment
protects him from any compelled disclosure of his illegal activities,"
which the defendant asserted would occur if he had reported his in-
come accurately in light of evidence that he was involved in narcotics
trafficking.159 In another example from his time on the Seventh Cir-
cuit bench, Stevens was the lone dissenter against a decision that
found a violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure when a defendant was not fully advised that his guilty plea to the
specific charge would make him ineligible for parole.160 However,
with respect to his concerns about the risk of improper police conduct
156. For example, in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion rejected a defendant's contention that he had not been free to leave when officers were
blocking the aisle while asking him questions on an interstate bus. According to O'Connor,
Bostick's freedom of movement was restricted by a factor independent of police con-
duct-i.e., by his being a passenger on a bus.... In such a situation, the appropriate
inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests
or otherwise terminate the encounter. . . . We have said before that the crucial test is
whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the
police conduct would "have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at
liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business."
Id. at 436-37 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)).
157. Oliver, 505 F.2d at 306.
158. Id. at 305-06.
159. Id. at 306-07.
160. United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 527 (1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[A] rigid rule
that makes a guilty plea vulnerable whenever a trial judge fails to supplement counsel's advice
with an enumeration of all significant consequences of the plea is neither necessary to the main-
tenance of civilized standards of procedure nor desirable.").
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while questioning suspects and the importance of defense counsel in
the adversary system, Springer, Fowler, and Oliver show that Justice
Stevens brought with him to the Supreme Court strong viewpoints
about the importance of Miranda rights, cultivated in part during his
time on the Seventh Circuit.
B. Miranda Issues and Justice Stevens on the Supreme Court
Table 1 illustrated the consistency and strength of Justice Stevens's
support for individuals whose Miranda claims were heard by the Su-
preme Court,161 but Justice Stevens did not reflexively support indi-
viduals in such cases.162 Consistent with the preceding discussion of
Seventh Circuit cases,163 Justice Stevens sided with the government in
some Miranda-related decisions by the Supreme Court.164 For exam-
ple, in Colorado v. Spring,165 Justice Stevens joined a majority opinion
that declared, over the dissents of Justices Marshall and Brennan, that
no Miranda violation occurred when federal agents did not inform a
suspect of exactly which crimes would be the subject of questioning
when they informed the suspect of his Miranda rights. In Illinois v.
Perkins,166 Justice Stevens joined a majority opinion that, over the dis-
sent of Justice Marshall, found no Miranda violation when an under-
cover police officer posing as a jail inmate asked questions of a fellow
inmate that elicited incriminating responses. These examples serve as
reminders of why Justice Stevens is regarded by scholars as a jurist
who looks closely at the facts of individual cases in seeking to serve
the ends of justice, earning him the label of pragmatist rather than
ideologue. 67
Although Justice Stevens often used his status as the senior Associ-
ate Justice in the majority to make important opinion assignments and
161. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
162. As indicated in Table 1, Justice Stevens supported individuals in only eighty-two percent
of Fifth Amendment Miranda cases. Id.
163. See supra notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
164. In Doyle v. Ohio, Justice Stevens endorsed prosecutors' cross-examination questions at
trial that challenged inconsistencies between the defendants' testimony and their silence after
receiving Miranda warnings. 426 U.S. 610, 621-22 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Greer v.
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
165. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
166. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
167. See Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism, and John Paul Stevens, in REHNQUIST JUS-
TICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAmic 157, 170-71 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003) ("Stevens's
judicial style reflects a preference for complexity, subtlety, and accuracy in individual cases over
predictability, clarity, finality, and cheapness. . . . Stevens is indeed more likely than his col-
leagues to pore over the facts in the record of a case and tie his proposed resolution to them
snugly.").
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perhaps to cultivate the support of wavering Justices,168 he only had
one opportunity to use that power in a Miranda case.169 He also
wrote one pro-Miranda majority opinion that was assigned to him by
then-senior Associate Justice William Brennan. 170 In evaluating the
legacy and impact of Justice Stevens on Miranda, one must look to
Justice Stevens's votes in support of retaining Miranda warnings as an
important protection for criminal suspects.171 However, relatively few
Miranda-related cases during Justice Stevens's career on the Supreme
Court produced decisions in support of individuals' claims because the
Burger Court and Rehnquist Court eras saw a shift toward limiting
and modifying the rights-enforcing rules of the Warren Court era. 172
Thus, the legacy of Justice Stevens on Fifth Amendment Miranda is-
sues is based largely on his dissenting opinions that defended Miranda
against the efforts of his conservative colleagues to "whittle away at it
or to construe it narrowly."' 73 These dissenting opinions, while not
numerous, enabled Justice Stevens to lay out strong arguments that
168. The turning point came in 1994, when Blackmun retired and Stevens became the
senior Associate Justice on the Court. . . . This part of the job requires political deft-
ness .... But he flourished in the role. "Stevens controlled the assignment of opinions
with great skills," Walter Dellinger said. "Sometimes he assigned the opinions to him-
self, but more important are the cases in which he gave up the privilege of writing the
opinion in landmark cases in order to secure a shaky majority." In 2003, Stevens asked
O'Connor to write the opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, [538 U.S. 306 (2003)], the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School case. That same year, Stevens bestowed on Kennedy
the opportunity to write Lawrence v. Texas, [539 U.S. 558 (2003)], the epochal gay-
rights case invalidating bans on consensual sex between adults of the same gender.
Jeffrey Toobin, After Stevens: What Will the Supreme Court Be Like Without Its Liberal Leader?,
THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 2010, at 38.
169. In Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), a five-Justice majority declared that police
officers cannot intentionally withhold Miranda warnings and seek incriminating statements
through questioning while planning to subsequently provide warnings and seek to have the state-
ments repeated in order to immunize those statements from the application of the exclusionary
rule. Justice Stevens assigned the majority opinion to Justice Souter.
170. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
171. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 429 (2000) (seven-member majority
reconfirmed the constitutional basis of Miranda warnings); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
478-80 (1981) (after a suspect asserted his Miranda rights and asked for an attorney, police
officers improperly sought to reinitiate questioning of the suspect outside of the presence of
counsel).
172. See, e.g., Charles M. Lamb, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: A Conservative Chief for
Conservative Times, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 154 (Charles
M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991) ("On Fifth Amendment self-incrimination questions,
Chief Justice Burger's tendency to decide for the prosecution was also pronounced. Although he
did not actively seek to directly overrule Miranda v. Arizona (1966), some of these cases demon-
strate his predilection to whittle away at it or to construe it narrowly."); Ogletree, supra note 18,
at 63 ("Under Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court has evinced a deep skepticism about the valid-
ity of the Miranda decision itself. It has, for example, virtually eliminated the requirement that
the Miranda waiver be given knowingly and intelligently.").
173. Lamb, supra note 172, at 154.
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will remain available to potentially influence and guide future judges
and Supreme Court Justices. 174
In Rhode Island v. Innis,175 the Burger Court majority found no Mi-
randa violation when, after giving the suspect the required warnings
and hearing the suspect request an attorney, an officer commented to
another officer that he hoped no children at a nearby school for the
disabled would find the gun discarded by the robber and hurt them-
selves.17 6 In response to hearing the officer's comment, the suspect
stated that he was willing to show the officers where the gun was hid-
den. 177 The majority held Miranda inapplicable, reasoning that the
officer's statement did not constitute interrogation because it was not
a question directed at the suspect.178 In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Stevens strenuously disagreed because he believed that any state-
ments, whether directed at the suspect or exchanged between officers
in the suspect's presence, "should be considered interrogation [when
they] appear designed to elicit a response from anyone who in fact
knew where the gun was located."1 79 Justice Stevens, whose life ex-
periences gave him reason to be wary of the risks of coercion that can
emerge from determined police efforts to obtain evidence, 180 saw the
majority's decision as creating an incentive for police officers to un-
dermine the fundamental purpose of Miranda:
[T]he Court's test creates an incentive for police to ignore a sus-
pect's invocation of his rights in order to make continued attempts
to extract information from him. If a suspect does not appear to be
susceptible to a particular type of psychological pressure, the police
are apparently free to exert that pressure on him despite his request
for counsel, so long as they are careful not to punctuate their state-
ments with question marks.... The Court thus turns Miranda's une-
quivocal rule against any interrogation at all into a trap in which
unwary suspects may be caught by police deception.18 1
In another example, Moran v. Burbine,18 2 the majority declined to
require police officers to inform a suspect that a specific attorney had
already notified the police that he was representing the suspect and
174. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 128 (4th ed. 1992) ("[Tlhe dissenting opin-
ion may be an appeal to a future Court. Indeed, in several instances a dissenting view on an
issue later became the Court's majority position.").
175. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
176. Id. at 295.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 302.
179. Id. at 312 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
181. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 313-14 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
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wanted to be present for any questioning.183 Indeed, a police officer
inaccurately or dishonestly told the attorney that the suspect would
not be questioned until the following day. 18 4 Instead, the police read
the suspect his Miranda rights, obtained his waiver of rights, and pro-
ceeded to question him without telling him that he was already repre-
sented by an attorney.185 Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy, indignant
dissent that castigated the majority for its disregard of the importance
of the adversary systeml 86 and its insensitivity to the risks of improper
police behavior when questioning suspects alone, behind closed doors:
"Until today, incommunicado questioning has been viewed with the
strictest scrutiny by this Court; today, incommunicado questioning is
embraced as a societal goal of the highest order that justifies police
deception of the shabbiest kind."' 87 Justice Stevens further asserted
that "[t]he possible reach of the Court's opinion is stunning. For the
majority seems to suggest that police may deny counsel all access to a
client who is being held." 88
Justice Stevens made it very clear that the application of the right to
counsel did not hinge on technical distinctions about the constitutional
source of the right. 189 The right existed in these circumstances
whether one viewed it as flowing from the Fifth Amendment when the
attorney has not yet met with the suspect, the Sixth Amendment when
representation has begun, or the Due Process Clause when an issue of
fundamental fairness arises. 190 As Justice Stevens indicated in an-
other opinion, the right to counsel is of paramount "importance [as]
one of the core constitutional rights that protects every American citi-
zen from the kind of tyranny that has flourished in other societies." 191
Justice Stevens argued for the recognition of a clear rights violation,
whether viewed as under one provision of the Constitution or another:
In my view, as a matter of law, the police deception of [the attorney]
was tantamount to deception of [the suspect] himself. It constituted
183. Id. at 417.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 417-18.
186. See id. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
This case turns on a proper appraisal of the role of the lawyer in our society. If a
lawyer is seen as a nettlesome obstacle to the pursuit of wrongdoers-as in an inquisito-
rial society-then the Court's decision today makes a good deal of sense. If a lawyer is
seen as an aid to the understanding and protection of constitutional rights-as in an
accusatorial society-then today's decision makes no sense at all.
Id.
187. Id. at 438-39.
188. Id. at 465.
189. Id. at 463.
190. Id. at 462-63. 466-68.
191. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 365 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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a violation of [the suspect's] right to have an attorney present dur-
ing the questioning that began shortly thereafter. The existence of
that right is undisputed. Whether the source of that right is the
Sixth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, or a combination of the
two is of no special importance, for I do not understand the Court
to deny the existence of the right.192
Moreover, Justice Stevens believed in "the principle that due pro-
cess requires fairness, integrity, and honor in the operation of the
criminal justice system, and in its treatment of the citizen's cardinal
constitutional protections."19 3 Thus, he concluded that the police ac-
tions also violated the right to due process: "In my judgment, police
interference in the attorney-client relationship is the type of govern-
mental misconduct on a matter of central importance to the adminis-
tration of justice that the Due Process Clause prohibits."194
C. Signs of New Directions at the End of the Stevens Era
Nearly all' 9 5 of Justice Stevens's opinions on Miranda issues were
written during the 1980s 96-the later years of the Burger Court era
and the early years of the Rehnquist Court era when a divided Court
struggled with how to limit or refine the Warren Court's rights-pro-
tecting decisions. 197 Unlike his opinions concerning other aspects of
constitutional rights in criminal justice such as search and seizure' 98 -
for which he wrote a number of opinions rejecting individuals'
192. Moran, 475 U.S. at 463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 467.
194. Id.
195. The primary exception is Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 620 (1976), a conservative dissent-
ing opinion written by Justice Stevens for a case that was argutd orally when he had been on the
Court for only two months. Justice Stevens, writing for Blackmun and Rehnquist, argued that it
was permissible for prosecutors to cross-examine defendants at trial concerning inconsistencies
between their testimony and their silence after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of arrest.
196. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 530-36 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 536 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157, 171 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 434 (1986) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 364 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 445 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 307 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. SmiTH, supra note 36, at 17 ("[T]he Burger Court era initiated the conservatizing process
of limiting rights that had been established during the Warren Court era . . . . Thus the Burger
Court set the stage for an erosion of criminal defendants' rights by the more conservative Rehn-
quist Court.").
198. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding that a drug-sniffing dog's exam-
ination of the exterior of a vehicle along a public road did not constitute a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding that when police
officers have probable cause to search an entire vehicle, they can search containers inside vehi-
cles without obtaining a search warrant).
128 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:99
claims-his Miranda opinions argued for greater protection of sus-
pects and greater emphasis on the importance of defense counsel.199
More than twenty years later, at the end of his career, Justice Stevens
began strenuously asserting his view on Miranda-related issues, and
these later opinions demonstrated his concerns about the newly
emerging trends in the Court to diminish suspects' rights during ques-
tioning and undervalue the importance of defense counsel. 200
In the 2010 case of Maryland v. Shatzer,201 the Court examined the
issue of when police can attempt to initiate questioning after a suspect
has invoked the right to counsel.202 Under the rule of Edwards v. Ari-
zona,203 a 1981 case in which Justice Stevens was a member of the
majority, police cannot initiate questioning after a suspect requests
counsel, even if they manage to obtain a waiver of rights from the
suspect before eliciting incriminating statements.204 In Shatzer, the
majority opinion by Justice Scalia declared that if there is a break of
two weeks or longer in the holding of the suspect for questioning, then
police are permitted to initiate questioning and seek a waiver of Mi-
randa rights because the Edwards invocation of counsel should not be
regarded as eternal.205 Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in
199. Moran, 475 U.S. at 467 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The one exception concerned the spe-
cific situation of a prosecutor asking questions to defendants on the witness stand in order
to show inconsistencies in their testimony. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 620 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
200. See Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010); Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010);
Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009). See also Anthony J. Franze, Death by a Thousand
Cuts: Miranda and the Supreme Court's 2009-10 Term, HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. ONLINE (Sept.
24, 2010,1:29 AM), http://hlpronline.com (discussing Supreme Court decisions in the 2009 Term
that diminished Miranda rights and the role of Justice Stevens). Justice Stevens may have reason
to be concerned that the Court will make a renewed effort to diminish rights in criminal justice
because Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito both appear to be more conserva-
tive in their approach to constitutional rights than their respective predecessors, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. For preliminary analyses of the voting
tendencies of Justices Roberts and Alito, see Thomas R. Hensley, Joyce A. Baugh & Christopher
E. Smith, The First-Term Performance of Chief Justice John Roberts, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 625,
631-33 (2007); Simon Lazarus, More Polarizing than Rehnquist, 18 THE AM. PROSPECT, May
2007, at 23, 23-27; Michael A. McCall, Madhavi M. McCall & Christopher E. Smith, Criminal
Justice and the 2006-2007 United States Supreme Court Term, 76 UMKC L. REV. 993, 997-99
(2008); Michael A. McCall, Madhavi M. McCall & Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and
the U.S. Supreme Court's 2007-2008 Term, 36 S.U. L. REV. 33, 35-45 (2008); Christopher E.
Smith, Michael A. McCall & Madhavi M. McCall, The Roberts Court and Criminal Justice at the
Dawn of the 2008 Term, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 265, 271-73 (2009).
201. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
202. Id. at 1217-18.
203. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
204. Id. at 484.
205. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223 ("We think it appropriate to specify a period of time to avoid
the consequence that continuation of the Edwards presumption 'will not reach the correct result
most of the time.' It seems to us that period is 14 days. . . . Confessions obtained after a 2-week
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the judgment because he did not believe that the right established by
the Edwards precedent mandated suppression of a subsequent state-
ment when there was a two-and-a-half-year break in custody between
the invocation of Miranda and the newly initiated questioning, as
there was in Shatzer.206 However, Justice Stevens strongly disagreed
with the Court's fourteen-day-break-in-custody rule because he saw it
as "insufficiently sensitive to the concerns that motivated the Edwards
line of cases." 207 In Justice Stevens's view,208 the Court's rule not only
undervalued the coercive pressures of custodial questioning outside
the presence of counsel, it could actually increase coercive pressure
when applied in specific situations:
A 14-day break in custody does not change the fact that custodial
interrogation is inherently compelling. It is unlikely to change the
fact that a detainee "considers himself unable to deal with the pres-
sures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance." [Arizona
v.] Roberson, 486 U.S., at 683, 108 S. Ct. 2093. And in some in-
stances, a 14-day break may make matters worse "[wihen a suspect
understands his (expressed) wishes to have been ignored" and thus
"may well see further objection as futile and confession (true or
not) as the only way to end his interrogation." Davis [v. United
States], 512 U.S., at 472-73, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (Souter, J., concurring in
judgment). 209
In a footnote, Justice Stevens seized the opportunity to reiterate his
strong views about the essential role that defense counsel must play in
protecting the rights of criminal suspects. 210
break in custody and a waiver of Miranda rights are most unlikely to be compelled, and hence
are unreasonably excluded." (citation omitted)).
206. Id. at 1228 (Stevens, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 1229.
208. Justice Stevens's strong views about the issue may have been shaped by his role in writing
a majority opinion in 1988 that expanded the reach of the Edwards rule to protect suspects from
police-initiated questioning about other crimes after the suspects invoked the right to counsel for
the crimes for which they had been arrested. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682-84
(1988).
209. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1231.
210. Justice Stevens stated,
Indeed, a lawyer has a "unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client
undergoing custodial interrogation." Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719, 99 S. Ct.
2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). Counsel can curb an officer's overbearing conduct, advise
a suspect of his rights, and ensure that there is an accurate record of any interrogation.
"Because of this special ability of the lawyer to help the client preserve his Fifth
Amendment rights once the client becomes enmeshed in the adversary process, the
Court found that the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable
to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege." Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S.
675, 682, n. 4, 108 S. Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Thus, "once the accused has requested counsel," courts must be especially wary of
"coercive form[s] of custodial interrogation." [Oregon v.] Bradshaw, 462 U.S., at 1051,
103 S. Ct. 2830 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
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In 2010, the Court also issued its decision in Florida v. Powell,211 a
case that directly addressed the required content of Miranda warn-
ings. Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion rejected the defendant's
claim that the police officer's statements-"[y]ou have a right to talk
to a lawyer before answering any of our questions" and "you have a
right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this inter-
view"-did not clearly inform him that he had a right to have counsel
present during questioning.212 Justice Ginsburg found that these
statements satisfied the requirements of Miranda.213 In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Stevens complained that the "natural reading of the
warning ... is that [the suspect] only had the right to consult with an
attorney before the interrogation began.. . . ."214 To Justice Stevens,
"the warning entirely failed to inform [the suspect] of the separate and
distinct right 'to have counsel present during any questioning.' 2 1 5
Therefore, as summarized in the words of Justice Stevens, "[T]his is, I
believe, the first time the Court has approved a warning which, if
given its natural reading, entirely omitted an essential element of a
suspect's rights." 216
A third decision in 2010 further eroded Miranda rights.217 Justice
Stevens did not write an opinion, but he was among the four dissent-
ers who endorsed the opinion by Justice Sotomayor that said,
Today's decision turns Miranda upside down. Criminal suspects
must now unambiguously invoke their right to remain silent-
which, counterintuitively, requires them to speak. At the same
time, suspects will be legally presumed to have waived their rights
even if they have given no clear expression of their intent to do so.
Those results, in my view, find no basis in Miranda or our subse-
quent cases and are inconsistent with the fair-trial principles on
which those precedents are grounded.218
Justice Stevens had seen in 2009 how the Roberts Court majority
seemed intent on whittling away aspects of rights for criminal suspects
and defendants, as illustrated in its decision in Montejo v. Louisi-
ana.2 1 9 Montejo reexamined an important precedential opinion by
Id. at 1230 n.3.
211. Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
212. Id. at 1200 (emphasis added).
213. Id. at 1200, 1205.
214. Id. at 1211 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 1212-13 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966)).
216. Id. at 1210-11.
217. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
218. Id. at 2278 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
219. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
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Justice Stevens twenty-three years earlier in Michigan v. Jackson.220
Although not specifically a Fifth Amendment Miranda-issue case, it
concerned the closely related context of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel as it arises with respect to police questioning of already-
charged defendants. 221 Moreover, references to the Miranda warning
appeared in the case as Justice Scalia claimed that such warnings pro-
vide sufficient protection for already-charged defendants who are de-
ciding whether to waive their Sixth Amendment right to counsel
during questioning,222 an assertion that Justice Stevens vigorously
contested. 223
The path to the Montejo decision in 2009 began in 1986 when Jus-
tice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Jackson, a decision that
Justice Scalia later characterized as "represent[ing] a 'wholesale im-
portation of the Edwards rule into the Sixth Amendment."' 2 2 4 The
Jackson decision concerned the ability of police to initiate questioning
220. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
221. See generally id.; see also Bidish J. Sarma, Robert J. Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Interroga-
tions and the Guiding Hand of Counsel: Montejo, Ventris, and the Sixth Amendment's Continued
Vitality, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 456, 461 (2009).
Instrumentally, the distinct purposes of counsel across the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
is best illustrated by framing the Fifth Amendment right as the right to "counsel as
protector," and the Sixth Amendment right as the right to "counsel as strategist." In
the Fifth Amendment context, the right to counsel gives the suspect an opportunity to
defend against attempts by the state to bully and badger the suspect into confessing. In
the Sixth Amendment context, however, counsel must weigh the costs and benefits of
each move the defendant makes-at every critical stage-and she must strategically
manage the flow of information between the state and the accused.
Id.
222. Under the Miranda-Edwards-Minnick line of cases (which is not in doubt), a
defendant who does not want to speak to the police without counsel present need only
say as much when he is first approached and given Miranda warnings. At that point,
not only must the immediate contact end, but "badgering" by later requests is prohib-
ited. If that regime suffices to protect the integrity of "a suspect's voluntary choice not
to speak outside his lawyer's presence" before his arraignment, ... it is hard to see why
it would not also suffice to protect that same choice after arraignment ....
Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090 (citation omitted).
223.
[T]he conclusion that Miranda warnings ordinarily provide a sufficient basis for a
knowing waiver of the right to counsel rests on the questionable assumption that those
warnings make clear to defendants the assistance a lawyer can render during post-in-
dictment interrogation.... Because Miranda warnings do not hint at the ways in which
a lawyer might assist her client during conversations with the police, I remain con-
vinced that the warnings prescribed in Miranda, while sufficient to apprise a defendant
of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, are inadequate to inform an unrepre-
sented, indicted defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to have a lawyer present at all
critical stages of a criminal prosecution. The inadequacy of those warnings is even
more obvious in the case of a represented defendant.
Id. at 2100-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
224. Id. at 2086 (quoting Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 175 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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after the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when
defendants had already been formally charged and requested attor-
neys at their arraignments.225 Reflecting his strong belief in the im-
portance of the right to counsel 226 and his sensitivity to the risk of
deceptive or coercive police practices, 227 Justice Stevens concluded
that the importance of Miranda/Edwards protections clearly contin-
ued after an assertion of the right to counsel in preliminary court
appearances:
Edwards is grounded in the understanding that "the assertion of the
right to counsel [is] a significant event,". . . and that "additional
safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel." . . . We
conclude that the assertion is no less significant, and the need for
additional safeguards no less clear, when the request for counsel is
made at an arraignment and when the basis for the claim is the Sixth
Amendment. We thus hold that, if police initiate interrogation after
a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of
his right to counsel, any waiver of that defendant's right to counsel
for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid. 228
In subsequent terms, Justice Stevens wrote dissenting opinions to
defend the principle that he had articulated in Jackson as the Court
majority weakened the "bright-line" application of the rule. 229 For ex-
ample, in Patterson v. Illinois,230 Justice Stevens dissented from the
majority's approval of the introduction of incriminating statements
obtained by police in post-indictment questioning of the defendant
outside of the presence of counsel. While the majority concluded the
defendant had "knowing[ly] and intelligent[1y]" waived his rights after
being given Miranda warnings,231 Justice Stevens, as the strong de-
fender of the adversary process, argued that the actions of police were
unethical as well as improper under the Sixth Amendment: 232
The Court should not condone unethical forms of trial preparation
by prosecutors or their investigators. In civil litigation it is improper
for a lawyer to communicate with his or her adversary's client with-
out either notice to opposing counsel or the permission of the court.
An attempt to obtain evidence for use at trial by going behind the
225. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626-29 (1986).
226. See supra notes 86-126 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 52-85 and accompanying text.
228. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
229. Justice Scalia characterized the Jackson rule as a "bright-line rule," Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at
2089, that provides only "marginal benefits" when weighed against the "substantial costs" it
imposes on "the truth-seeking process and the criminal justice system." Id. at 2091.
230. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 301 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 300.
232. See id. at 302 ("As our holding in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), suggests,
such a practice would not simply constitute a serious ethical violation, but would rise to the level
of an impairment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.").
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back of one's adversary would be not only a serious breach of pro-
fessional ethics but also a manifestly unfair form of trial practice. In
the criminal context, the same ethical rules apply and, in my opin-
ion, notions of fairness that are at least as demanding should also be
enforced.233
In Michigan v. Harvey,234 Justice Stevens objected when the major-
ity permitted the use of incriminating statements for impeachment
purposes when such statements were obtained through a post-arraign-
ment police interview with a suspect outside of the presence of de-
fense counsel. 235 The strength of Justice Stevens's opposition to what
he viewed as the erosion and "manipulat[ion]" of the Jackson princi-
ple was evident in his characterization of the majority's reasoning as
"nothing more than an argument against the rule of law itself."236
Drawing upon his longstanding concerns about the risks of deceptive
and improper police conduct, Stevens further declared that "[t]he
tragedy of today's decision is not merely its denigration of the consti-
tutional right at stake; it also undermines the principle that those who
are entrusted with the power of government have the same duty to
respect and obey the law as the ordinary citizen." 237
Justice Stevens again found himself arguing against the Court's dim-
inution of the right to counsel in McNeil v. Wisconsin.238 In that case,
the police questioned a jailed robbery defendant, who was already
represented by a public defender on the robbery charge, about other
crimes in a different city. 23 9 When the defendant waived his Miranda
rights and made incriminating statements, the Court permitted those
statements to be used against him.2 4 0 Justice Stevens began his dis-
senting opinion by forthrightly declaring, "The Court's opinion de-
means the importance of right to counsel." 241 He predicted that the
Court's decision would give "leeway [to] ... the police to file charges
selectively in order to preserve opportunities for custodial interroga-
tion" 242 for separate offenses, even when "the investigations were con-
current and conducted by overlapping personnel." 243 He reiterated
this sensitivity about the risk of deceptive, manipulative law enforce-
233. Id. at 301 (footnote omitted).
234. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990).
235. Id. at 355 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 369.
237. Id.
238. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
239. Id. at 173-74.
240. Id. at 177-78.
241. Id. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 187.
243. Id. at 187-88.
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ment practices in the opinion when he chastised the majority for its
"refusal to acknowledge any 'danger of "subtle compulsion."' "244
The majority's decision in McNeil also elicited a strong statement
from Justice Stevens about the importance of counsel in the adversary
system that forms the foundation for truth-seeking and the protection
of rights in American judicial processes.245 Justice Stevens was very
troubled that "the Court's decision is explained by its fear that making
counsel available to persons held in custody would 'seriously impede
effective law enforcement,' "246 thereby treating the lawyer as a "net-
tlesome obstacle to the pursuit of wrongdoers." 2 4 7 Justice Stevens
complained that the Court's decision "evidences an inability to recog-
nize the difference between an inquisitorial and an adversarial system
of justice." 248 What he described as the Court's "preference for an
inquisitorial system of justice" clashed directly with Justice Stevens's
steadfast advocacy for the American tradition of truth-seeking de-
fense lawyers and the adversary system.249 According to Justice
Stevens,
Undergirding our entire line of cases requiring the police to follow
fair procedures when they interrogate presumptively innocent citi-
zens suspected of criminal wrongdoing is the longstanding recogni-
tion that an adversarial system of justice can function effectively
only when the adversaries communicate with one another through
counsel and when laypersons are protected from overreaching by
more experienced and skilled professionals. 250
He also quoted his own past argument from Moran:251 "'If a lawyer is
seen as an aid to the understanding and protection of constitutional
rights-as in an accusatorial society-then today's decision makes no
sense at all." 252
After establishing important protections against the questioning of
charged defendants outside of the presence of counsel in Jackson253
and then defending that principle against the Court's expansion of po-
lice authority in Patterson,254 Harvey,255 and McNeil,256 Justice Ste-
244. Id. at 189 (citation omitted).
245. Id. at 188.
246. Id. (quoting id. at 180).




250. Id. at 188.
251. See supra notes 182-94 and accompanying text; see also Moran, 475 U.S. at 412.
252. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 189 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 468 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting)).
253. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
254. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988); see also supra notes 230-33.
134 [Vol. 60:99
JUSTICE STEVENS & MIRANDA
vens must have been disheartened when, in the middle of oral
arguments for Montejo,257 Justice Alito suddenly made the out-of-the-
blue suggestion that the Court should consider overruling Jackson, de-
spite the fact that this prospect had not been raised, briefed, or argued
by the parties as an issue in the case.258 This suggestion led to the
unusual circumstance of the Court ordering the parties to submit addi-
tional briefs on the issue of whether Justice Stevens's majority opinion
in Jackson should be overruled.259 The issue divided interested ob-
servers and experts as the Obama Administration and eleven states
advocated overruling Jackson, while a number of former judges and
prosecutors claimed that the Jackson holding had provided a worka-
ble, bright-line rule to guide police.260 Defense attorneys argued that
"the protection offered by the [C]ourt in Stevens' 1986 opinion [in
Jackson] is especially important for vulnerable defendants, including
the mentally and developmentally disabled, addicts, juveniles, and the
poor . . . ."261 Ultimately, Justice Scalia, the Justice who virtually
never supports the protection of Miranda-related rights, 262 wrote for
the five-member majority that overruled Jackson.263 Justice Scalia's
opinion was pointedly critical of Justice Stevens's majority opinion in
Jackson264 as well as Stevens's dissenting opinion in Montejo.265 In
the oral announcement of the Court's decision, Justice Scalia was
quite harsh in summarizing his criticisms of Justice Stevens's Jackson
opinion. He said that the opinion was "poorly reasoned, has created
no significant reliance interests and . . . is ultimately unworkable." 2 6 6
255. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990); see also supra notes 234-37.
256. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 171; see also supra notes 238-52.
257. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
258. See Marcia Coyle, As Nominee Is Announced, High Court Issues Police Interrogation
Ruling, Two Others, THE NAT'L L.J. (May 27, 2009), http://www.law.com ("[Tihe question of
whether Jackson should be overruled was raised by Justice Samuel Alito Jr. during March argu-
ments in Montejo's case. The high court ordered additional briefing on the issue.").
259. Id.
260. See Mark Sherman, Obama Legal Team Wants to Limit Defendants' Rights, SEATTLE
TIMEs ONLINE (Apr. 23, 2009, 1:43 PM), http://www.seattletimes.nwsource.com.
261. Id.
262. See Table 1, supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
263. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009).
264. Justice Scalia described Jackson as providing "marginal benefits" and being "simply su-
perfluous" and concluded that "there is no reason to retain the rule," which he indicated was
"unworkable." Id. at 2088-91.
265. Justice Scalia's majority opinion described Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion as
"[p]roceeding from [a] fanciful premise" and "rest[ing] on a flawed a fortiori." Id. at 2086-87.
266. Oral Opinion announcement of Justice Scalia: Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079




Justice Stevens fired back in his dissenting opinion, accusing the ma-
jority of "a misinterpretation of Jackson's rationale and a gross under-
valuation of the rule of stare decisis."267 He asserted that "Jackson
protects a fundamental right that the Court now dishonors" 268 and de-
clared that the majority "flagrantly misrepresent[ed] Jackson's under-
lying rationale" 269 in making an "unwarranted" decision to overrule
the precedent.270 He also objected to the majority's overruling of
Jackson when the parties had not raised the issue or presented evi-
dence about problems caused by the precedent. 271
The depth of Justice Stevens's concern about and disagreement with
the majority's decision to overrule Jackson was especially evident in
his decision to dissent orally from the bench when the Montejo deci-
sion was announced, 272 a relatively rare practice that has been charac-
terized as "a different order of magnitude of dissent."273 Scholars who
study oral dissents have concluded that "given the length of Justice
Stevens's career, he has demonstrated a relative unwillingness to read
his dissent (Stevens has read only 3.4 percent of all dissents he au-
thored)." 274 It was only the twenty-first time in his then-thirty-four
year career on the Supreme Court that he had announced an oral dis-
sent,275 and none of his prior oral dissents had been in Miranda-re-
lated or right to counsel cases. 276 Presumably, Justice Stevens
267. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2094.
268. Id. at 2096.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 2101.
271. See id. at 2094.
272. Coyle, supra note 258.
273. See Robert Barnes, Over Ginsburg's Dissent, Court Limits Bias Suits, WASH. POST, May
30, 2007, (quoting Co-Director of Georgetown University Law Center's Supreme Court Institute
Richard Lazarus).
274. William D. Blake & Hans J. Hacker, "The Brooding Spirit of the Law": Supreme Court
Justices Reading Dissents from the Bench, 31 JUST. Sys. J. 1, 7 (2010).
275. Jill Duffy & Elizabeth Lambert, Dissents from the Bench: A Compilation of Oral Dissents
by U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 102 LAW LIBR. J. 7, 26-37 (2010).
276. See id.; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amend-
ment); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (police automobile pursuit); Uttecht v. Brown, 551
U.S. 1 (2007) (potential jurors in capital cases); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006)
(Clean Water Act); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (federal sentencing guidelines
and the role of the jury); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (habeas corpus jurisdiction
and proper defendant); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (congressional redistricting and
gerrymandering); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (allegations of national origin dis-
crimination and Title VI funding); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav-
ings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (federal legislation and states' sovereign immunity); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (congressional power and gun regulations); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (Fifth Amendment taking of property without just compensation);
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (antitrust issues in price
discrimination); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (victim impact statements at sentencing
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dissented orally because of his strong objections to the proactive over-
ruling of a precedent that he had personally articulated and strongly
defended over a period of more than two decades.277
In his written opinion, Justice Stevens raised concerns about how
the majority's "decision can only diminish the public's confidence in
the reliability and fairness of our system of justice." 278 In his oral dis-
sent, however, he spoke specifically about other undesirable conse-
quences by saying that the Court's "unwise" decision to overrule
Jackson "can only have an adverse impact on the law enforcement
profession and the rule of law itself."279
In addition, while the written dissent used only a brief footnote to
argue that prosecutors-and by extension the police-are ethically
obligated through lawyers' rules of professional conduct to refrain
from direct contact with defendants who are represented by coun-
sel,280 the oral dissent emphasized this issue. Justice Stevens's oral
dissent devoted attention to his view that ethical prosecutors, who he
believed constituted the vast majority of prosecutorial officials in the
United States, would respect the ethical rules that had required them
to act in accordance with the overruled Jackson precedent.281 Thus,
he claimed that it was "only the rare unethical prosecutor whose con-
hearings in capital cases); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (First Amendment and flag
burning); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (federal mail fraud statute); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (Fourth Amendment rights of prisoners); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980) (Medicaid funding for abortions); Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (news media
access to a jail); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (affirmative action in federal con-
tracts); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (race-based affirmative action
in university admissions). In 2010, Justice Stevens presented another oral dissent in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, concerning the First Amendment rights of corporations
to spend money to influence election campaigns. See Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corpo-
rate Campaign Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 2010, at Al ("Justice John Paul Stevens
contibut[ed] a passionate 90-page dissent. In sometimes halting fashion, he summarized it for
some 20 minutes from the bench . . . .").
277. The motivation to issue an oral dissent when the majority is altering precedent is consis-
tent with social science findings about those occasions when Justices seem most inclined to speak
from the bench. See Blake & Hacker, supra note 274, at 18. In Montejo, Justice Stevens's action
also fit with scholars' hypotheses about an increased likelihood of oral dissents when the Court is
closely divided, id. at 17-18, and when the oral dissenter has great "ideological distance" from
the author of the majority opinion, in this case Scalia, the Justice least likely to support Miranda-
related rights in any case. See Timothy R. Johnson, Ryan C. Black & Eve M. Ringsmuth, Hear
Me Roar: What Provokes Supreme Court Justices to Dissent from the Bench?, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1560, 1576 (2009).
278. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2099 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
279. Oral dissent of Justice Stevens, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_07_1529 [hereinafter Oral dissent of Justice
Stevens].
280. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2098 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281. Oral dissent of Justice Stevens, supra note 279.
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duct [was] endorsed by the Court" when it overruled Jackson.28 2
Given that Justice Stevens's life experiences have made him keenly
aware of the risks that law enforcement officials will violate rules in
their efforts to obtain convictions, 283 it seems possible that he was
looking for a way to preserve the Jackson rule in practice since it had
lost its stature as constitutional law. Justice Stevens's oral dissent did
not emphasize in an elaborate fashion the risks of deceptive conduct
by justice system officials as he had done in other written opinions
over the years. Instead, Justice Stevens sought to have his oral pro-
nouncement, with national news media reporters in attendance at the
Court, instruct prosecutors about their ethical obligation to, in effect,
follow the now-overruled Jackson principle in order to avoid placing
themselves into the undesirable category he had labeled as "the rare
unethical prosecutor." 284
By stating that the majority decision "can only have an adverse im-
pact on the law enforcement profession and the rule of law itself,"285
Justice Stevens was effectively telling prosecutors that not only would
they violate ethics rules if they stopped following the Jackson princi-
ple, they would also fundamentally harm their profession and society
itself by exploiting the new opportunity to approach and question de-
fendants outside of the presence of defense counsel. Although Justice
Stevens attempted to frame the issue for the news media and prosecu-
tors as one involving the professional self-interest of law enforcement
officials, it is uncertain whether this message or the underlying ethical
obligation of prosecutors will guide police officers' behavior. Indeed,
it is possible that prosecutors will be quite tempted to turn a blind eye
to the ethical concerns highlighted by Stevens and willingly benefit
from police officers' new opportunity to question already-charged and
represented defendants.286
The oral dissent by Justice Stevens is similar to oral dissents in other
cases by Justice Ginsburg that were characterized as "'signifying an
increasing frustration" 28 7 with the conservative majority on the Rob-
erts Court. The oral dissent may have reflected a recognition by Jus-
282. Id.
283. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
284. Oral disssent of Justice Stevens, supra note 279.
285. Id.
286. Indeed, the entire post-Jackson line of cases in which Justice Stevens felt obligated to
dissent may indicate that situations arise with some degree of regularity in which police officers
seek to question already-represented defendants outside the presence of counsel. See supra
notes 230-44 concerning Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S.
344 (1990), and McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
287. Barnes, supra note 273 (quoting Richard Lazarus).
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tice Stevens, as the inevitability of retirement approached, that the
Montejo decision could be one of his last opportunities to raise his
voice against the diminution of Miranda rights and the right to coun-
sel. 288 In speaking out on these issues, Justice Stevens fulfilled one
scholar's view that "[a] Supreme Court Justice who chooses to give
personal voice [through oral dissent] . . . is engaging in a public-ad-
dressing, publicly accountable and thus commendable part of his or
her judicial service." 289 Whether or not the content and emphases in
his oral dissent are remembered, its existence is recorded for history
as an exclamation point on years of carefully crafted and consistently
forceful judicial opinions embodying his exceptional advocacy for Mi-
randa rights. In addition, his dissenting opinion in Montejo and other
cases will remain available for future Supreme Court Justices, lower
court judges, and legal scholars who will shape the course of constitu-
tional doctrine over time.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice John Paul Stevens distinguished himself as one of the Su-
preme Court's foremost defenders of Miranda-related rights. His
viewpoint on the importance of Miranda rights was linked to his per-
sonal experiences-as a young man who grew up in Chicago, a Su-
preme Court law clerk, a practicing attorney handling pro bono cases,
and a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit-
that led him to develop both sensitivity to the risks of deceptive and
abusive practices by law enforcement officials and strong beliefs about
the essential role of defense attorneys in the American adversarial
system of justice. Throughout his career on the Supreme Court, he
drew from these experiences and beliefs to write opinions that
strongly defended the necessity of Miranda rights and clear, strong
rules for police and prosecutors to obey. Because of the time period
in which he served on the Court, he was forced to use dissenting opin-
ions to defend the importance of Miranda and the right to counsel.
This was especially true during the early years of the Rehnquist Court
and in his final Terms as a member of the Roberts Court, as the Su-
preme Court's composition changed through the arrival of Justices
who generally favored giving greater discretionary authority and flexi-
288. See Liptak, supra note 51, at 1.
289. John 0. Barrett, Op-Ed., Commending Opinion Announcements by Supreme Court Jus-
tices, TALKING JUSTICE BLOG (June 4, 2007), http://communities.justicetalking.org/blogs/All
Blogs.aspx.
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bility to law enforcement officials.290 With respect to this area of law,
Justice Stevens leaves a legacy of opinions containing strongly argued
justifications for the protection of criminal suspects and the proper
respect for the important role of defense attorneys. In light of his
special role as the defender of Miranda and the right to counsel,291 the
retirement of Justice Stevens will cost the nation's highest Court not
only his "mastery of the [C]ourt's machinery" 292 and its "leader of the
[C]ourt's liberal wing," 293 but also the strongest, most articulate voice
that defended the adversary system of justice, 294 opposed deceptive
practices by police,295 and demonstrated sensitivity to the vulnerabil-
ity of suspects who are subjected to an array of tactics that can "'be
confusing to anyone, but would be especially baffling to defendants
with mental disabilities and other impairments.' 296
290. During the Reagan Administration, the elevation of William Rehnquist to Chief Justice
and the appointments of Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, see THE SUPREME COURT AT
WORK, supra note 3, at 205-08, contributed to the "Supreme Court decisions of the 1980s that
loosened the limits on police behavior." Smith, supra note 54, at 159. Conservative Justices who
support the government's position in criminal justice cases and thereby limit the scope of rights
effectively expand officials' authority and arguably "creat[e] opportunities for criminal justice
officials to engage in abusive behavior." SmiTH, supra note 36, at 8-9. The voting records of
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito in criminal justice cases are equally support-
ive of government authority as those of the Reagan era appointees. See Smith, McCall & Mc-
Call, supra note 200, at 271.
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